Introduction
In February 2012, the U.S. Sentencing Commission generously invited me to testify at a hearing addressing the question of what, if anything, ought to be done to modify the advisory federal guidelines system bequeathed us by the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker. 1 The remarks that follow largely track what I said at the time, but have been amplified in light of the excellent presentations I heard there and of intervening developments. I advance three arguments:
First, the post-Booker advisory system retains most of the flaws of the system it replaced, while adding new ones, and its sole relative advantage -that of conferring additional (and effectively unreviewable) discretion on sentencing judges -is insufficient to justify its retention as a permanent system.
Second, there exist a number of constitutionally permissible alternatives to the courtcreated Booker system, one of which --that originally proposed by the Constitution Project and more recently endorsed by Judge Sessions -is markedly superior to the present system. Third, the difficult problem is not designing a sentencing mechanism better than either the pre-or post-Booker guidelines, but ensuring that such a system, once in place, does not replicate pre-Booker experience and become a one-way upward ratchet prescribing ever higher sentences. I offer suggestions about how it might be solved. However, any fair-minded observer must concede both the difficulty of this problem and the justice of the concern that, however imperfect the advisory system, it may be the best that can be achieved given the present constellation of institutional and political forces.
II. The Post-Booker Advisory System
Considered on its own merits, the system bequeathed us by Booker is indefensible. It retains virtually every feature excoriated by critics of the original sentencing guidelines. Its extreme 'advisoriness,' while partially ameliorating some problems with the original guidelines, reintroduces the very concerns about unreviewable judicial arbitrariness that spawned the structured sentencing movement in the first place. More importantly, the post-Booker system does not solve the biggest problem with the pre-Booker system -that its architecture and institutional arrangements predisposed the Commission's rule-making process to become a oneway upward ratchet which raised sentences often and lowered them virtually never.
A. Post-Booker Advisory Guidelines Retain Nearly All the Defects of Pre-Booker Presumptive Guidelines
The original guidelines were condemned as too complicated, 2 both because they contained so many rules that were purportedly difficult to understand and, more tellingly, because they required parties to litigate and judges to adjudicate too many gradations of too many categories of facts. But the current system is even more complicated than the old. The guidelines themselves remain in place, almost unchanged. Probation officers are legally obliged to write presentence reports that are virtually identical to those they wrote before 2005. The parties are obliged to make the same sorts of factual presentations and legal arguments they made before 2005. District judges remain legally obliged, on pain of appellate reversal, to make the same multifarious findings of fact and to correctly apply the same voluminous rules to those facts to determine a guidelines range. Then, once the old familiar dance is complete, the judge does a few new steps to the tune of " §3553(a) factors" and only then imposes a sentence. Even the courts of appeals retain much of their old pre-Booker burden inasmuch as they remain obliged to entertain and decide questions regarding interpretation of guidelines rules, even though they now have little authority to insist that district courts sentence within the guidelines range. In short, all of the procedural and computational complexities that were so often the source of pre-Booker complaints about the guidelines remain mandatory, even as the product of that process has been declared the next thing to a legal nullity.
The old guidelines were criticized because their many factual findings fed into a grid that subdivided the universe of possible sentences into 258 boxes which critics said served largely to create a reassuring illusion of rationally calibrated allocations of punishment. But the advisory system still uses the exact same grid.
The old guidelines were derided because the numerous judge-found facts that determined a defendant's guideline range were said to be a tail that wagged the sentencing dog, i.e., that postconviction judge-found facts had a far greater influence on a defendant's final sentence than the jury-found elements of the crime. But the same description applies to the post-Booker advisory system. Booker's "solution" to the tail-wags-dog problem was not to eliminate or even reduce the number of judge-found sentence-affecting facts enumerated in federal statutes and guidelines, but was instead to imagine that, by declaring the Guidelines advisory, those facts would no longer move the dog of sentencing outcomes. But, of course, the dog still moves. In FY 2010 and FY 2011, about 55% of all federal defendants were sentenced within the applicable guideline range, 3 and even among defendants sentenced outside the range, the range (determined by all those judicial findings of facts) still exercises a substantial anchoring effect. Given that, in the five years immediately preceding Blakely, guidelines compliance averaged around 65%, 4 the best one can say about the advisory system is that the guidelines tail is still wagging the sentencing dog, but about 10% less vigorously.
Curiously, the constitutional value those advancing the tail-wags-dog critique ostensibly sought to protect -the power of juries to decide sentence-affecting facts -has quietly vanished from the post-Booker conversation. If concern for jury power was ever more than a convenient stick with which to beat a system unpopular on other grounds, it may be worth noting that the practical effect of Booker on jury participation in sentence-determinative fact-finding has, if anything, been negative. The percentage of federal defendants convicted by trial, rather than plea, already low before Booker, has declined steadily since 2006, 5 and in FY 2011dropped to 3.1%, 6 the second lowest level in history.
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More importantly, the real procedural deficiency of the pre-Booker guidelines was never the absence of jury participation, but the low level of due process protection afforded defendants seeking to contest aggravating guidelines facts. 8 The government's burden of proof was a mere preponderance. The defendant had no discovery rights, other than the government's general Brady obligation to disclose favorable evidence, 9 no right of confrontation or crossexamination, 10 and not even a right to an adversarial hearing in many instances. 11 Even though, as noted above, the advisory guidelines continue to either determine or strongly influence the sentences of the vast majority of federal defendants, the former dearth of procedural due process persists. And precisely because the guidelines are now legally advisory, the argument for increasing procedural protections for guidelines fact-finding is dramatically weaker. Defendants [after Booker] are poorly placed to demand new procedural protections for the determination of Guidelines facts the Court insists have no legal consequence. If anything, the effect of Booker and its progeny will surely be to diminish due process protections in federal sentencing as trial and appellate judges become less and less concerned about accuracy in an "advisory" system. For anyone seriously concerned about the tail-wags-dog problem, Booker has created the worst of all worlds -a complex system of fact-dependent rules, which in truth heavily influence outcomes, but in which judges are cavalier about facts because the rules have no formal legal force.
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The old guidelines were criticized as the product of an opaque rule-making process not subject to the APA or other openness in government laws or to judicial review. 13 Relatedly, many observers complained that Commission rulemaking was subject to congressional micromanagement, either by direct amendment of guidelines, statutory directive, or informal pressure. While the Commission has taken laudable voluntary steps to open up its processes in recent years, its institutional position in the government and the laws governing its rulemaking processes are unaffected by Booker.
Perceptive critics of the pre-Booker guidelines were concerned that they abolished parole and with it the opportunity for a later second look at the appropriateness of the original judgeimposed sentence.
14 Of course, this feature survives Booker. Thus, the legal authority to determine how much time a defendant will actually serve, which before 1987 was shared between district judges and the U.S. Parole Commission, and from 1987-2005 was shared between the Sentencing Commission and both district and appellate judges, is now effectively the sole province of individual district judges. In short, district judges now wield near-absolute power to determine the length of a defendant's incarceration, far more real-world sentencing power than at any time since the advent of a federal parole authority in 1910.
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The old guidelines were also disparaged for taking insufficient account of the individual characteristics of criminal defendants in setting offense levels and thus sentencing ranges. Critics noted that the guidelines prescribed precise increments of increased or reduced punishment for a multitude of offense-related factors, but included no such correlation between personal characteristics (other than criminal history) and offense level. Moreover, the old guidelines declared many such characteristics to be banned or "not ordinarily relevant" in 12 when or how these factors should be considered other than to say that it should be done in unusual or atypical cases. The real difference between the present system and the one it replaced lies not in any material improvement in the Guidelines themselves, but in the fact that judges are now legally at liberty to ignore them.
B. The Curious Attraction of Booker's Advisory System
Here, at last, we come to the crux of the matter -the point that explains the surpassingly odd spectacle of folks who spent the first two decades of the guidelines era vehemently denouncing the guidelines for precisely the deficiencies listed above now mounting an impassioned defense of a post-Booker system that retains virtually every flaw they previously deplored.
This precipitous reversal at least makes institutional sense in the case of judicial guidelines critics. For many judges, the main problem with the guidelines, particularly after the 2003 PROTECT Act, was their tight constraint of judicial sentencing discretion. Now, although some judges may consider the required fact-finding and guideline-calculating a nuisance, it is a ritual to which they are accustomed, it provides them with reassuring benchmarks for routine cases, and Booker has freed them either to use or ignore the results as suits them in particular cases. Of course, judges must provide some explanation for their sentences, but the reality is that any explanation not flamboyantly exceeding the boundaries of rationality will now survive appellate scrutiny. In short, district judges like advisory guidelines because they restore lost institutional authority.
The affection of the defense community for advisory guidelines is based, not in concerns about process or the sanctity of judicial discretion, but in perceptions about outcomes. The true ground of the defense community's objection to the old guidelines was never their structural and procedural defects. It was their severity. In the early days, the severity critique was primarily directed at drug cases, but over time the concern broadened to include many other offense classifications, recent high-profile examples including white collar crime and pornography. The defense community's support of advisory guidelines is only explainable as the outgrowth of a perception that the advisory system produces more favorable (i.e., more lenient) sentences for some appreciable class of defendants.
This perception has some basis in fact. After all, in FY 2011, 43.6% of all defendants were sentenced below the applicable guideline range as compared to only 29.7% in FY 2003 (the last full year of sentencing data before the Blakely decision in 2004). 18 If about 14% more defendants are now receiving below-range sentences, then surely some of them are receiving shorter sentences than would have been the case before Booker. This intuition seems to be borne out by Figure 1 , which shows a notable decline in the length of the average federal sentence beginning in 2008, the year following the Supreme Court's December 10, 2007 decisions in Kimbrough and Gall which made clear that the guidelines were henceforth to be really and truly advisory.
Moreover, as Figure 2 below illustrates, during the last decade, there has been a near-perfect inverse correlation between sentence severity and the exercise of judicial sentencing discretion. As the percentage of sentences outside the applicable range increases, the length of the average sentence decreases, and vice versa. However, a closer look at the data suggests that the recent decline in average sentence length is, at best, only partially attributable to the newly advisory character of the guidelines. It is widely understood that some of the recent decline in average sentence length is probably attributable, not to discretionary choices by judges, but to changes in statutes and guidelines governing crack and powder cocaine. What is less appreciated is that the marked decline in average federal sentence beginning in 2008 correlates directly with the recent explosion in relatively low-sentence immigration prosecutions. Figure 3 illustrates the point. FY 2008 may have been the year in which judges reading Kimbrough and Gall first understood that they had a green light to vary from the guidelines at will, but probably more importantly it also marked the beginning of a huge upsurge in immigration cases, which went from 17,592 or 24 The tenuousness of the correlation between declining national average sentence severity and post-Booker judicial discretion is reinforced by inspection of the Commission's most recent data on average sentence within offense types. It appears that, since 2006, the average sentence for crack cases has declined sharply; average powder cocaine, marijuana, and illegal reentry sentences have dropped slightly; average sentences for alien smuggling, methamphetamine, and heroin cases have held roughly steady; and average firearms and property crime sentences have increased.
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These figures hold mixed messages for policy advocates. The defense community is surely right in thinking that advisory Guidelines have produced lower sentences for some thousands of defendants each year. Given the slow, but steady, increase in below-range sentences since 2007, they would also be right in thinking (even if they may not be impolitic enough to say it) that the percentage of defendants benefiting from this phenomenon is likely to increase steadily over time. On the other hand, those who fear that advisory guidelines have opened the floodgates of judicial leniency should be reassured that nothing apocalyptic has occurred so far and that average sentences for most classes of defendants are, at most, only slightly lower than historic averages in the guidelines period.
The foregoing observations go far to explain the lack of agitation among the front-line sentencing actors for a thorough-going reform of the post-Booker status quo. For persons enmeshed in an operating system and highly attuned to any change in incremental advantage or disadvantage to their own positions, it makes perfect sense to ask, not whether Booker produced the best possible system, or even a system that, dispassionately considered, is very good, but 22 Id. at Figs. C-I. simply whether the Booker system is incrementally better or worse for them than its predecessor. Judges and defense lawyers have concluded that they are incrementally better off. The Justice Department seems to have concluded that it is, so far, not so much worse off as to make it worthwhile to press for a thorough reform.
The perspective of the Commission, of Congress, and the public at large ought to be rather less parochial. If, as I believe to be true, the pre-Booker guidelines system was so flawed as to require complete overhaul, then the question before us now is whether Booker remedied enough of those flaws to make the post-Booker advisory system a desirable long-term mechanism for sentencing federal defendants. I do not believe the post-Booker system meets that standard.
For example, the real severity problem with the pre-Booker guidelines was not that judges had too little discretionary power to make adjustments for unusual defendants whose situations did not fit sentence levels that the Guidelines had set about right for most classes of cases. The problem was that, as a result partly of some initial decisions in 1987 and partly of a long process of factor-creep thereafter, the guidelines often prescribed unnecessarily lengthy sentences for entire categories of defendants. Making the Guidelines advisory does not solve this problem. It gives some defendants relief by allowing judges to disregard rules they think too severe, but it does not change the rules themselves. So long as the rules prescribe unduly lengthy sentences, post-Booker experience suggests that most defendants for whom those sentences are prescribed will get them, or at best sentences only slightly lower. It is more than a trifle ironic to hear longtime critics of guideline severity cite the modest extent of most downward variances from the guideline range as a defense of the current system. 23 And the question of who gets the guidelines sentence and who does not will be based far more on the personal predilections of the judge assigned the case than the particular characteristics of the defendant.
Supporters of the advisory system make much of the proliferation of "feedback" to the Commission in the form of an increased number of variances from the Guidelines. They claim that the Commission will react to this new source of information about judicial sentencing preferences by embarking on rounds of corrective amendments. I confess to skepticism.
First, the problem with the pre-Booker system was never an absence of feedback from judges (or any of the other system actors) about their concerns with the guidelines. The Commission has always been at the delivery end of a fire hose of feedback. The problem before Booker was that the Commission was unwilling or unable to change the rules in response to the feedback they had.
Second, the Commission has been more active in the last several years in passing ameliorative amendments to the Guidelines, making commendable strides on crack and some other issues. But I confess to thinking that its ability to make these strides has had far more to do with the fact that Democrats gained control of both the House and Senate in January 2007 and won the presidency effective January 2009 than with any Booker-generated increase in the volume or quality of judicial feedback to the Commission.
Third, even in the more hospitable recent environment, the Commission has been unable to address some glaringly obvious problem areas. For example, it has been almost universally recognized since 2003 that the sentences prescribed by the Guidelines for high-end white collar offenders are so high as to be practically worthless. 24 Observers on both the political left and right, as well as judges, the defense bar, advocacy groups, and the Justice Department, have been providing "feedback" on this issue for years signaling that they are actively seeking or are at least amenable to reform. Yet the Commission has not acted. No fair-minded person would attribute this inaction to either a lack of awareness or a lack of good will on the part of the Commission. Yet nothing has happened.
The Commission's newest amendments to the fraud guidelines in response to the DoddFrank Act, which take effect in November 2012, differ commendably from those adopted in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in largely eschewing new enhancements that would continue the process of factor creep. 25 Nonetheless, perhaps feeling that some identifiable new increment of severity was politically required, the Commission added a minimum offense level of 14 for those "engaged in an organized scheme to engage in insider trading," 26 as well as a crossreference triggering the enhancement for use of a special skill for certain job descriptions in the securities industry. 27 In short, the 2012 round of amendments does not reduce the severity of fraud sentences called for by the Guidelines, but nudges them higher than ever.
The problem is that the structural and institutional deficiencies in the pre-Booker guidelines rule-making system remain essentially unaddressed by Booker. I will not reiterate the complete analysis of this phenomenon that I have provided elsewhere. 28 Suffice it to say that the combination of the guidelines' complexity, the desire of the Justice Department for case-level control and rule-making influence, the persistent political incentives for Congress to legislate harsher sentences, and the Sentencing Commission's institutional inability to resist the alliance of congress and the executive whenever they seek "tough" sentences made the guidelines rulemaking process a one-way upward ratchet before Booker. I see nothing in the post-Booker arrangements that materially alters this reality. I fail to see how an "advisory" system which maintains the same bad rules and the same structural inability to fix them is magically transformed into a desirable outcome simply by virtue of conferring on individual judges the authority to ignore at will the rules they happen to dislike.
C. The Sentencing Empire of the Federal District Court Judge
Which brings me to a third major concern about the post-Booker system. Supporters of the post-Booker system whose approval rests on the additional "feedback" provided by district court variances are embracing an extra-legal mechanism which has few, if any, analogues in AngloAmerican jurisprudence. In any other setting, when district courts apply or interpret or adjudicate challenges to agency rules, their decisions not only bind the parties, but are appealable to courts of appeals, and in the end form part of the web of legislation and interpretive judicial precedent that binds subsequent litigants, judges, and sometimes the rule-making agency itself. That is, they are part of the process of making law. Yet, in the "advisory" world, district judges routinely make decisions that are effectively unreviewable as to substance. Because they are effectively unreviewable, they are incapable of creating precedent binding other courts. And because they bind neither courts nor the Commission itself, to the Commission they represent nothing more than data points in an opinion poll. If one is to have sentencing rules at all, it seems to me that the appropriate "feedback loop" when judges apply those rules to punish other human beings is the normal operation of the adjudicative process.
D. A Few Words About Disparity
Now that district judges are at liberty to impose nearly any sentence they choose, an earlier generation of sentencing critics would have anguished over the unjust disparities between similarly situated defendants that must surely arise in an arrangement so devoid of coordination or constraint. Defenders of the advisory system, however, are resolute in their determination to banish all discussion of disparity. They argue variously that sentencing disparities are inevitable (or even desirable) in a large federal system, 29 that the pre-Booker guidelines did not materially reduce disparity, or that the advisory guidelines have not materially increased it. Sometimes, in a nicely Orwellian twist, they even seem to argue that there is really no such thing as an unwarranted disparity because different sentences necessarily reflect judicial determinations of importantly different individualizing factors. 30 And sometimes they simply declare that disparity just is not that important relative to other concerns like severity.
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While it is surely true that in the Guidelines era disparity has sometimes received undue attention, the disparity arguments by admirers of advisory guidelines mostly miss the mark.
Regional disparity: In the first place, significant differences between the sentences imposed 29 30 Id. at --. 31 See, e.g., Testimony of James Felman, supra note 26, at 3 ("The problem is severity not disparity.").
on similarly situated defendants based on the place they happen to be arrested should concern us. Surely, if the national government prescribes penalties for crime, those penalties should be imposed with at least rough uniformity throughout the nation. It is one thing to recognize that perfect uniformity is not possible and that some regional variation is inevitable. It is another thing altogether to imply that regional disparity is a positive good and one of the wonders of federalism. Serious proponents of a legally presumptive guidelines system do not imagine that perfect uniformity is possible, but would suggest that perfect anarchy is undesirable and that presumptive rules can help reduce disparate treatment.
At present, there is no statistically rigorous analysis of whether the post-Booker system has materially increased regional disparity. However, rough indicators of such a trend do exist. In 2010, in another FSR article, I described signs of increasing post-Booker regional sentencing disparities. 32 The trend appears to be continuing. Consider, for example, Figures 4A and 4B , which compare the ten districts with the lowest and highest percentages of in-range sentences in 2003, the last full year before Blakey was decided, and 2011. While both years show significant variation from the most-to-least guidelines-adherent districts in the country, by 2011 the variations are much bigger. In 2003, the difference between the most and least guidelinesadherent districts was 47.8% and between the tenth most and least guidelines-adherent districts was 17.4%. By 2011, the difference between the most and least guidelines-adherent districts was not that much greater, at 55.8%, than it was in 2003, but the gap between the tenth most and least guidelines-adherent district nearly doubled in comparison to 2003 to 34.7% The point is even better illustrated by Figures 5A and 5B, which are scatter plots of the percentage of sentences within range for all judicial districts in 2002 and 2011. Viewing these images, there is no escaping the fact that the sentencing practices across the country are far more disparate in 2011 than they were in 2002. Intra-judge disparity: Whatever may be said about regional disparity, one of the acknowledged accomplishments of the Guidelines was that they reduced the degree of disparity between sentences imposed by different judges in the same district. 33 As with regional disparity, there is not as yet definitive evidence of the effect of Booker on inter-judge disparity, but preliminary indications are consistent with the intuition that judges freed of appellate control will sentence more idiosyncratically than those subject to enforceable rules. The one rigorous study conducted in the District of Massachusetts showed that in the years following Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall, the effect of judge identity on sentencing outcome more than doubled.
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Now that the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse has succeeded in creating a sentencing database with judge identifiers, 35 it would be surprising indeed if similar results were not replicated in other districts.
Disparity and Politics:
Regardless of the merits of the disparity debate, its political importance can hardly be overstated. Before Booker, the federal sentencing system needed fundamental revision. Booker did not change that reality. Sooner or later, the growing evidence that the advisory guidelines are an institutional façade obscuring increasingly divergent judicial practice will draw sufficient attention from political actors that change will come. The only question is when the crisis will arrive, and what form the change will take. Figure 5B:
FY 2011 -% Sentences in Range -All Districts
III. The Objectives of a New System
If the current advisory system is to be replaced, we must be reasonably confident that the replacement: (a) is constitutional under the post-Booker rules, (b) gives reasonable, but not unlimited, play to individualized sentencing and judicial discretion, (c) prescribes sentences that reasonably effectuate the utilitarian goals of crime control while conforming more closely to most people's moral intuition about severity than many of the current guidelines, and (d) is capable of evolution without becoming a one-way upward ratchet.
IV.
Constitutionally permissible guidelines architectures
Given the current state of post-Booker Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, 36 there are at least five constitutionally permissible, operationally practicable basic sentencing architectures:
1) Return to pre-guidelines discretionary sentencing: One might abandon the entire structured sentencing enterprise and revert to the pre-1987 federal status quo in which district judges had unguided and virtually unreviewable discretion to impose a sentence anywhere between the statutory maximum and minimum sentence as traditionally defined. This would be constitutional. 37 No institutional actor in federal sentencing favors this approach.
2) "Blakely-ized" guidelines: At the other extreme, one might simply require that juries find all facts now specified by the guidelines that would increase a defendant's offense level. This would be constitutional, but it would be both procedurally burdensome and even more restrictive of judicial discretion than the guidelines in their pre-Booker form.
38 So far as I know, no institutional actor in federal sentencing favors this approach.
3 Blakely 41 and, for a time, it was the preferred remedy of the Justice Department. 42 However, the approach was always subject to the objection that it asymmetrically favored the government, as well as the nagging concern that the Supreme Court might abandon the rule of McMillan and Harris upon which its constitutionality depended. 43 The Justice Department no longer seems enamored of this approach and I am aware of no other institutional actors currently supporting it.
4) "No-base-offense-level" guidelines: It is possible to reinstitute legally binding guidelines systems based on post-conviction findings of fact by judges, and to do so constitutionally, by the simple expedient of eliminating "base offense levels" or their equivalents from the guidelines design. I have described this guidelines architecture previously, 44 but it has not been generally discussed. Its constitutionality flows from the three essential points of the Apprendi-Blakely-Booker line of cases. First, the government must allege and prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury each and every element of a criminal offense. Second, an element is any fact that increases the statutory maximum sentence of an offense. And third, what Justice Ginsburg identified as "Apprendi's bright-line rule" --"The 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."
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In short, the key moment for the Sixth Amendment jury right is the moment at which the jury has rendered its verdict or the defendant entered his plea. If, at that moment, the law correlates the jury's verdict or defendant's plea with a maximum penalty above which the judge may not sentence a defendant without finding some additional fact, that maximum penalty becomes the "statutory maximum sentence." Any fact, proof of which would permit the judge to impose a sentence above that maximum sentence, becomes an "element" requiring submission to a jury. It was this focus on the sentencing options available to the judge at the moment of conviction without further fact-finding that rendered the Washington, California, and federal guidelines sentencing regimes unconstitutional. In each case, the jury's verdict had two sentencing effects -first, it set the absolute outside limits on the judge's sentencing discretion in the form of statutory maximum and minimum sentences as traditionally understood, and second, it created a presumptive sentencing range (or in the case of California, a presumptive singlepoint sentence) based purely on the fact of conviction. In all three of the invalidated systems, a 43 I confess to finding this eventuality unlikely because the Court would not only have to overrule both McMillan and Harris, but would have to find that the jury right extended not only to facts that raised the mandatory minimum sentence, but also to those which raised the presumptive minimum sentence. But then, so far, I have not been particularly adept at predicting the Court's decisions in this area. 44 See, Bowman, Debacle, supra note 12, at 460. 45 Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. at 288-89 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. at 303). judge could impose a sentence above the presumptive sentence or range, but in all of them the judge could not do legally so without finding some fact(s) in addition to those found by the jury (or admitted by the defendant).
The Washington state guidelines invalidated in Blakely v. Washington 46 prescribed for each offense in the Washington criminal code a presumptive sentencing range based purely on the fact of conviction. 47 This range was customarily somewhere in the middle of the broader span between the statutorily designated minimum and maximum sentences for the crime. After conviction, the judge could sentence the defendant above (or below) the presumptive range if, but only if, he made findings of aggravating (or mitigating) facts not included within the offense of conviction. 48 However, in no case could the judge sentence the defendant to more than the maximum sentence prescribed by statute for the offense of conviction.
The California guidelines system invalidated in Cunningham v. California 49 functioned similarly, except that the fact of conviction generated both a statutory minimum-to-statutorymaximum range and a presumptive single-point sentence within that range -the so-called "middle term." By law, the sentencing judge was obliged to impose the middle term unless the judge found "circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime." 50 If, but only if, the court found an aggravating circumstance, it was permitted, but not required, to impose an upper term sentence.
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Finally, for the vast majority of federal crimes, the federal guidelines set a "base offense level," i.e., an offense level generated purely by the fact of conviction of a particular crime. This base offense level, in conjunction with the defendant's criminal history (which need not be found by a jury pursuant to U.S. v. Almendarez-Torres), produces a sentencing range identifiable at the moment of conviction. The constitutional flaw in the federal guidelines was thus that every increase in offense level above the base level required at least one judicially-found fact, as did any departure above the top of the final sentencing range. Particularly because most federal guidelines were designed with relatively low base offense levels and multiple potential upward level adjustments, much and maybe most of the customary judicial fact-finding activity in a workaday federal sentencing had the effect of raising the defendant's maximum sentence above the top of the range associated with the base offense level. Accordingly, since judicial findings of fact raised the defendant's maximum sentencing exposure higher than that authorized by the base offense level created by conviction alone, the process was found to violate Blakely.
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One could create guidelines that meet the Court's Sixth Amendment test by eliminating the correlation between the mere fact of conviction and any particular guideline offense level. In such a system, at the moment of conviction, it would be impossible to determine "solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant" 53 any maximum limit on the judge's sentencing authority other than the statutory maximum in the traditional sense. For example, a conviction of one count of mail fraud would, standing alone, have no sentencing consequence other than to authorize a maximum sentence of thirty years pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1343. At the time of the verdict or plea, the defendant, his lawyer, the prosecutor, and the judge might be able to form a good estimate of what facts the sentencing judge might later find and thus how subsequent guidelines calculations would pan out, but as a matter of law, no guideline maximum would be generated until the sentencing proceeding was concluded. The final guideline range would be determined by judicial findings, but the guideline maximum would almost invariably be below, and would never exceed, the statutory maximum sentence determined by the jury-found elements of the offense. Thus, there would be no Sixth Amendment violation.
This approach would certainly be better than "topless guidelines" inasmuch as it would not require an unfair asymmetry. Like the "topless" model, it could be invalidated by the Court if they were to reverse Harris because it, too, would involve correlating judge-found facts with increases in a presumptive minimum sentence. Otherwise, I am hard pressed to see a constitutional flaw based on the Sixth Amendment as the Court has construed it. The most obvious objection to this approach is not that it is constitutionally defective, but that it could be employed to resurrect the guidelines, with all the flaws enumerated above, virtually unchanged. For that reason, I do not favor its adoption. There are several existing guidelines, notably 2D1.1, which do not assign base offense levels based purely on the fact of conviction. In my view, these guidelines are constitutional as written. However, the existence of some constitutional enclaves within a structure that, for the most part, uses an unconstitutional design is not enough to save the whole. 53 Booker World." 55 The group recommended that, in the near term, the advisory system created by
Booker should be carefully studied and incrementally improved. 56 But the group went on to suggest a framework for a revised federal guidelines system should the advisory system ultimately be found wanting. 57 The Constitution Project guidelines framework rested on five basic elements. First, the sentencing grid should be markedly simplified by widening sentencing ranges and reducing the number of offense levels from 43 to something on the order of ten. 58 Second, the defendant's position on the vertical offense seriousness axis of the grid (and thus his sentencing range) would be determined by facts found by juries. 59 Third, if it were thought wise to guide judicial sentencing discretion within the widened ranges, the rules or standards providing that guidance should not be unduly detailed or restrictive. 60 The Constitution Project/FSR/Sessions model represents the most desirable option among the constitutionally permissible architectures. All the variations on this theme so far proposed, though they differ in their details, combine a solution to the technical constitutional problem posed by Blakely with structural modifications designed to address many of the major substantive criticisms of the pre-Booker guidelines.
1. They would be simpler than the existing guidelines, requiring fewer findings of fact.
This simplicity would make jury involvement practical (unlike the option of Blakelyizing the existing guidelines) because juries would be asked to find only a few facts in addition to the conventional elements now confided to their charge. It should also make the post-conviction judicial sentencing process simpler. 2. The system's relative simplicity should give political actors fewer opportunities for micromanaging sentencing outcomes. 3. The wider ranges would give judges more room for the operation of judicial discretion, while placing some reasonable presumptive limits on that discretion. 4. Various mechanisms have been suggested for constraining or guiding judicial discretion within the wider presumptive ranges. 65 My current view is that the best approach both in substance and in relation to potential constitutional challenges is simply to write advisory guidelines enumerating aggravating and mitigating factors that judges should consider in exercising their discretion to sentence near the bottom, in the middle, or towards the top of the range. 5. In this system, the ranges created by jury findings would be presumptive only. In order for such a system to meet its policy objectives, the judge must have substantial discretionary departure authority to impose a sentence below the jury-determined range and the decision to depart should be subject to appellate review. While it is difficult to articulate a precise standard in advance, the degree of departure authority and the standard of review should no more restrictive than that granted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Koon. 66 In my view, a system structured in this way would balance the need for some legal constraint on judicial sentencing discretion with the need for ample judicial authority to individualize sentences in particular cases. 6. Because of the Court's decision in Booker, there could be no discretionary authority to depart above the jury determined presumptive guidelines range. However, it would be possible to create a mechanism for presenting to juries some predetermined set of factors that, if found, would permit a judge to sentence above the otherwise applicable range in truly egregious or aggravated cases. 7. This system would also permit meaningful, though appropriately deferential, appellate review of district court sentencing decisions within jury created ranges. A real difficulty in any post-Booker system is designing a process of appellate review for sentences within statutory maxima and minima that does not run afoul of the Blakely construct of what an "element" is. For example, Justice Scalia believes that any substantive review of a sentencing judge's choice of sentence within the statutory maximum and minimum runs afoul of Blakely because the appellate court's ruling would have the effect of creating by common law certain zones above which a defendant could not be sentenced without the sentencing court finding particular facts. 67 However, I think the majority of the Court would accept a regime requiring that a judge provide a statement of reasons for assignment of a within-range sentence and that the judge's sentence and his explanation be reviewable on a reasonableness standard.
B. Sentence length
Essential to the success of a new structured model would be a genuine and bipartisan effort to re-examine and, where appropriate, recalibrate the federal sentencing scale for all offenses. This will sound to some like code for an effort to reduce federal sentence length willynilly. But I hope it will be remembered that the first seventeen years of my professional life were spent primarily as a federal and state prosecutor and, while I may have mellowed a bit with age, I still believe in stern punishments for those who have done evil. The problem with many corners of the federal sentencing guidelines is that, with the accretion of amendments over 25 years, they have gradually become divorced from any rational calculation of how much punishment of what type best meets the objectives of a society that deserves both protection and an intelligent allocation of the resources it contributes to fighting crime. 66 518 U.S. 81 (1996) . 67 See, Bowman, Debacle, supra note 12, at 444-47 (discussing Justice Scalia's concurrence in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)).
The latter point deserves our particular attention. In past debates over federal sentence length, the cost of protracted imprisonment of numerous defendants was never a limiting consideration. That may no longer be the case. Concern over deficit financing of the federal budget is now bipartisan. And I am reliably informed that the cost of running the Bureau of Prisons is becoming so high that the Justice Department is facing the prospect of cutting programs devoted to catching criminals now on the street in order to pay for the cost of incarcerating those already in prison. A better balance can surely be achieved.
Moreover, those whose focus is primarily on ensuring appropriately severe punishment should remember something that everyone involved in the day-to-day operation of federal criminal law already knows -rules, whether "mandatory" or "advisory," that prescribe sentences significantly higher than can be supported by ordinary intuitions of justice will be ignored or evaded. Professor Heise and I documented this phenomenon in drug cases a decade ago. 68 A current, and even more glaring, example is the sentencing of high-loss corporate offenders. Guidelines for these cases are now pitched so high, calling for multi-decade sentences for virtually every defendant of even moderate culpability, that no one pays them any serious attention. Prosecutors and judges alike would be far better served by fraud guidelines that prescribed sentences that, while tough, could be rationally imposed.
While I may be naïve, it should be possible, over a reasonable interval, to work out between the institutional actors a system that prescribes appropriately stern, but realistic, sentences and arrives at an equilibrium between judicial discretion and legislative will.
VI. "A Republic … If You Can Keep It"
Even if the post-Booker system is undesirable, and even if one can design a materially better system that, at its inception, calibrates sentences rationally and provides appropriate balance between general rules and individualizing discretion, how do you keep it? What assurance is there that the new system will not degenerate in undesirable ways? To this there are two answers:
First, there can be no absolute assurances. The nature of human systems is that they change. Flawed systems sometimes improve. Even the best-designed system will to some extent degrade on contact with messy reality. However, I do not think that the chimera of a perpetually perfect system should be a permanent barrier to enacting a system better than what we now have.
Second, the forces that combined to transform the 1987 guidelines into a one-way upward ratchet are sufficiently strong that one should not adopt a new system without accounting for those forces. In the end, this may be the single hardest problem facing the would-be reformer of federal sentencing. Time and space preclude a full exploration of this problem; however, I
